

8 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bannerman

STAT Dr. [] has submitted a second report in which he recommends positive steps to plan for the development of Agency history in an intelligent and systematic way. On 4 October 1968 Colonel White asked to hear from you within the next few days (a telephone call will do) giving your reaction to the concept set out by Dr. [] Your reaction, along with those of the other Deputy Directors has apparently been requested by the Director. STAT

STAT Dr. [] has commented on the partial histories which have already been written ([] STAT
[] He also noted that there is now a time lag of 18 years in the writing of the overall history of the Agency and 15 years in the history of its components, and this gap is increasing. He believes that the interval between the completion of a given volume of history and the present should be kept within three to five years. He further recommends that our history effort;

- a. covers the entire Agency;
- b. be concerned with the roles of the Director and CIA in the national intelligence effort, and with the organization, structure, activities, and operation of the Agency;
- c. include the historical writings previously done and being done in the Agency;
- d. make provision for the identification, creation, needs, and retrieval of the records for historical purposes, and;
- e. be under the direction and control of a Chief Historian and Historical Staff, assisted by a Historical Board in each Directorate. The Historical Staff would include a historical officer for each of the four Directorates.

STAT Dr. [] defines the catch-up program as concerned with the overall history of the Director/CIA, 1950-1965 and the historical programs of the four Directorates, 1946/47-1966. Dr. [] notes that this catch-up program will take an effort of some magnitude and a number of additional writers to complete all of the programs as they now stand prior to 1971/72, at which point the ongoing programs, largely written by the proposed Historical Staff, should begin. STAT

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Dr. [] proposes a permanent Historical Staff of 13, including four secretaries.

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
I certainly see no objection to the proposal made by Dr. [] that a permanent Historical Staff should be set up, nor do I differ with him on the scope of the problem as he outlines it.

The Support Directorate is now deeply involved in what he calls the "catch-up program" and experience so far has certainly proved that it is a voluminous, lengthy and difficult program to bite off. The main problem naturally is writers; on this point Dr. [] makes no recommendation other than that we continue with staff employees and contract personnel. At least this comment should focus the attention of the Director and Colonel White on our continuing need for contract help in the historical program.

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I suggest that you concur in Dr. [] basic recommendations for the permanent Historical Staff set up, possibly emphasizing to Colonel White the continuing need of the Support Directorate for re-hiring annuitants in order to keep our program going.

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Executive Registry

68-3746/4

4 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
~~Deputy Director for Support~~

As you know, the Director desires that we take some positive steps to plan for the development of our history in an intelligent and systematic way. It was primarily to help us decide how we were going to proceed that we asked Dr. [] to join us.

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Attached is Dr. [] report proposing a specific program which would catch us up and keep us current. I should appreciate hearing from you within the next few days (a telephone call will do) giving me your reaction to this concept. Please don't bother to comment on the staffing, grades, etc. What I want to know is whether or not you agree that this is a proper approach to the problem. The report has been reviewed by [] and I have discussed it briefly with the Director, who requested that I seek your reactions before launching the program on a more formal basis.

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L. K. White

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Attachment

A Historical Program for the
Central Intelligence Agency--
Second Report

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		
TO: Deputy Director for Support		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
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REMARKS:		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

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A HISTORICAL PROGRAM FOR THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECOND REPORT

1. On 30 April, I submitted an interim report, consisting of some observations and suggestions for a historical program for the Agency, with a Historical Staff to direct and carry out the program. Underlying this report were three strongly held beliefs: (a) the program should make full use of the historical writing previously done in the Agency and that being done by the present Historical Staff and in the historical programs of the four directorates; (b) a sharp distinction must be made between a continuing, permanent program and a catching-up activity, with a very considerable effort being made to eliminate the present backlog; and (c) work on the ongoing and on the catching-up programs must proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The present report repeats these beliefs, discusses the problem of catching-up, especially as it affects staffing; and includes some further observations on the organization of the Historical Staff and on the nature of the permanent program.

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2. The historical program which is described in the present report, is one that (a) covers the entire Agency; (b) is concerned with the roles of the DCI and CIA in the national intelligence effort, and with the organization, structure, activities, and operations of the Agency; (c) includes the historical writing previously done and being done in the Agency; (d) makes provision for the identification, creation, retention, and retrieval of records for historical purposes; and (e) is under the direction and control of a Chief Historian and Historical Staff, assisted by a Historical Board in each directorate.

3. In addition to the distinction between the ongoing, permanent program and the catching-up program, a distinction should be made between the overall history of the DCI-CIA and the histories of the four directorates. Closely related to these differentiations are three determinations: (a) the location of a line setting off overall history from directorate history, (b) the location of a line separating the catching-up program from the continuing program, and (c) the length of the time-lag between the terminal date of a history and the present.

4. The overall history is history at the highest policy level and includes the DCI and the CIA in the intelligence

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community, the DCI as head of CIA, the Office and Area of the DCI, and the relations of the DCI and the Deputy Directors of Intelligence, Plans, Science and Technology, and Support. The area of overall history may be shown graphically on an organizational chart of the Agency. A line drawn across the chart, through the center of the offices of the four deputy directors will set off the area of overall history from that of directorate history. This can not be a sharp division, for the overall history reaches down into the directorates, with policy decisions and actions, and the work of the directorates extends upward. It is intended, however, that the histories of the offices of the four deputy directors be included in the directorate programs. Drawing the line through the middle of the offices of the four deputy directors emphasizes this duality. Overseas activities and operations of the Agency, fall in one or the other area, depending on their nature, magnitude, and significance.

5. For a date to mark the end of the catching-up program and the beginning of the ongoing, permanent program, there are good choices, for the overall history, in 1961 or 1965. The first marks the end of the administration of Allen Dulles

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as DCI; the second that of John A. McCone. It seems preferable to periodize by terms of office of DCIs, rather than by administrations of presidents of the United States. A third possibility for periodization is found in the occurrence of some substantial change in the organization of CIA, or in some aspect of its work. For the historical programs of the directorates the dividing date has already been assigned as 1966+, that is, at the end of 1966 or 1967.

6. Several reasons suggest 1965 rather than 1961 as the dividing date between the catching-up program and the continuing program of the overall history. There is some advantage in having the dates of the overall and the directorate programs coincide or very nearly so; in having the members of the Historical Staff and the historical writers working together on the same period of time. It is desirable not to have too great a time-lag in the overall program. If 1961 should be the dividing date, it might very well happen that it would be 1971/72 before the history of the McCone administration was completed and that of Admiral Raborn was begun. There would then be a six or seven years' time-lag, and a new catching-up period might soon be required. Since the

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Chief, Historical Staff, is likely to come from outside the Agency, and since he is to write the overall history at the top level, there are practical grounds for having him start with 1965. He will have less of a research job to do before getting down to writing and can be in a better position to carry out his other responsibilities with respect to the entire historical program. Meanwhile, men with long, personal experience in the Agency can write the earlier years of CIA at the policy level.

7. There is now, as will be seen, a time-lag of eighteen years in the writing of the overall history of the Agency and of fifteen years in the history of its components, and this gap is increasing. While a historian normally works with a time-lag, and usually a very considerable one, this should not be the case in the present instance, where it is highly important to have an up-to-date record based on firsthand documentation, knowledge, and experience available for current reference and use. Here the interval between the completion of a given volume and the present should be kept within three to five years. Such a brief interval gives maximum usefulness to the work. It gives time for identifying,

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gathering, and organizing the source materials, for constructing a chronology and outline, and for the writing. It even allows time for some interpretation and for seeing what happened in a perspective, even though brief. Once the catching-up has been completed, and the backlog of histories has been eliminated, it is strongly recommended that the time-lag be held to not more than three to five years for all histories that are to be updated and continued. Where an office has been abolished or a drastic change in structure or organization has taken place, or where an activity or operation has been completed, its history should be written as soon thereafter as possible.


8. Catching-up. To date there have been two substantial histories of CIA, both written from within the Agency; that



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Organizational History of Central Intelligence Agency, 1950-

1953, completed in 1957 and likewise in ten chapters. The

 is a history of the Agency from the establishment of CIG, in 1946, and is concerned with the infighting that took place, and with the efforts to establish an effective CIA in

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the face of opposition and competition from other intelligence organizations. It is written at top level, and is not concerned with the day-by-day work of the Agency in collecting and producing finished intelligence, or with the mission of the Clandestine Services. It is a very fine effort for what it does. Some portions have been published in Studies in Intelligence.

25X1 The [] Organizational History, is a detailed account of the various offices of the Agency during the administration of General Walter Bedell Smith. It lacks the treatment of the Agency at the policy level, which is the 25X1 feature of the [] history. Since [] go back to 1946 in tracing the organizational development of the Agency, there is some overlapping [] but 25X1 it is more a matter of supplementing than of repeating, as their intent is different. There has been some further writing by

25X1 [] and some by [] 25X1 [] for the years 1953-1956 and 1960. This, also, is of the organizational type, and deals with offices in the Directorates of Intelligence and of Support. The writing is fragmentary and unfinished, and again does not give an overall picture of the Agency. Despite differences in approach and treatment in all this historical writing, the achievement, in each instance, has

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been solid and useful.

9. The catching-up program is concerned with (a) the overall history of the DCI-CIA, 1950-1965, and (b) the historical programs of the four directorates, 1946/47 - 1966+. As has been stated, the overall history includes the role and position of the DCI in the national intelligence effort as the principal intelligence officer of the Government and as head of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the organization and structure of the Agency and its activities and operations, and, as necessary, down through offices, staffs, centers, services, stations, and bases. The detailed treatment of the components and of their roles in the activities and operations of the Agency, apart from those of the O/DCI and DCI Area, belongs, however, to the historical programs of the directorates.

The catching-up program so far as it relates to the overall history of DCI-CIA may be divided into (a) rounding out and adding to the [redacted] histories, 1946-1953; (b) writing the overall history of the Allen Dulles and John A. McCone administrations, 1953-1965; and (c) writing the histories of the various components of the O/DCI and DCI Area, 1946/47 - 1965.

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10. As has been pointed out, the [] history was written at the top level, with little on the offices or on the intelligence activities of the Agency. There was little on the Clandestine Services either. The question, then, is how far one should go in accepting this as sufficient for the purposes of overall history. Help comes from two sources; from the

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[] Organizational History which extends back to 1946 in its treatment of CIG and CIA offices, and so helps to fill a gap in the [] history, and from certain histories in the directorate programs, which likewise, go back to the beginnings of CIG and CIA. These latter histories include the Clandestine Services. The great omission, then, of the [] History is any substantial examination and consideration of the role and position of the Clandestine Services at the top level of the Agency, 1946-1950. This lack might be met by an additional chapter to []

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11. For the administration of General Smith, the great lack in the [] history is of a top level treatment of the DCI and CIA, and also of the role of the Clandestine Services. Aspects of the CS during these years are being covered in the historical program of the Clandestine Services.

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What is needed then is an overall consideration and appraisal of the Smith period, including the CS. This may require two or three additional chapters, but it is essential that an estimate of this important era in the life of CIA be made. The same person might handle both this and the [] assignment.

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12. For the Allen Dulles period, 1953-1961, there is at present no overall account. There has been some writing by [] of a preliminary and interpretative character, dealing particularly with 1960, and some chapters on support functions, 1953-1956, by [] and on ORR, OSI, and OBI, by [] With these exceptions the whole of the Dulles administration has yet to be written at the overall level. This is not an easy assignment, for this period includes the Bay of Pigs and other episodes. Similarly, the John A. McCone administration, 1961-1965, remains to be written at the overall level, and in this case no preliminary writing has been done. In writing the history of these two administrations, the plan followed should more nearly approximate that of [] since the historical programs now in effect in the four directorates largely eliminate the need for the organizational presentation used by [] and [] Increasingly, the writing of the overall history

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of DCI-CIA requires that attention be given, beyond the earlier and customary topics of interest and concern, to the newer methods and techniques of intelligence collection and processing, to activities and operations abroad, some of which have attracted public attention, and to the public image and the position of CIA.

13. For the first two parts of the catching-up program at the overall level, as stated in Section 9, the minimum needs in staff are: a historical writer to supplement the []

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25X1 [] histories, 1946-1953; a second historical writer for the Allen Dulles period, 1953-1961; and a third for the administration of John A. McCone, 1961-1965. For the first writer, 12 to 18 months should be sufficient to complete the assignment; for the second, three to four years; and for the third, three years. In addition to these three, who may be regular staff members assigned to this task or contract employees, there should be a research associate or research assistant and one clerk-typist.

14. The third part of the catching-up program, at the overall level, consists in writing histories of the offices and other components of the O/DCI and the DCI Area, including the

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United States Intelligence Board, the Office of National Estimates, the Office of National Intelligence Programs Evaluation, Office of the Inspector General, Office of the General Counsel, Office of the Legislative Counsel, Office of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting, and the Cable Secretariat. These should be written as part of the catching-up program in the same way as histories of the directorates programs: by regular staff members assigned to this duty or by contract employees. Once the backlog of these studies has been eliminated, help in the permanent program will come from the Deputy Chief, Historical Staff.

15. The historical programs now in effect in the Directorates for Intelligence, Science and Technology, Plans, and Support are very substantial programs that will cover in detail, when completed, the many offices, staffs, centers, divisions, stations, and bases of the Agency, and also the more important activities and operations. In existence for several years, these programs have already resulted in a number of histories, some of them quite good, but the flow is uneven, since writers are lacking for a number of studies, and in other instances, the writer assigned to a history has been reassigned to other duties before the completion of his work. There is,

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then, a considerable backlog, and it will take an effort of some magnitude and a number of additional writers to complete all the programs as they now stand prior to 1971/72, when, according to plan, the ongoing programs should begin.

16. As the historical programs of the four directorates proceed, and more and more histories are written, these programs should be examined and evaluated, at frequent intervals, to determine (a) the quality of the histories that are being produced, (b) how adequately each directorate is being covered as to its structure, work, and achievements, and whether there are any serious deficiencies or omissions, and (c) the extent to which directorate histories contribute to Agency history on the policy level and supplement it.

17. Proceeding simultaneously with the catching-up program will be the ongoing, permanent program of overall histories and histories written in the programs of the directorates. It is important that in the effort to eliminate the backlog, the ongoing program should not falter and a new backlog be created. The time-lag in the continuing program should not exceed the three to five year interval, whether in regard to new studies or older ones to be updated, or whether these

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are in the overall program or in the directorate programs.

As mentioned earlier, the Chief, Historical Staff, assisted by the Deputy Chief, is to write the overall history at the top level, while the Deputy Chief and historical writers will write the histories of the O/DCI and the DCI Area. These historical writers will be members of the regular staff of the Agency or contract employees.

18. At the directorate level, the permanent program will be in charge of a Historical Officer, one for each directorate, assisted by a Historical Board. The Historical Officer will normally write the history of the Office of Deputy Director of the directorate to which he belongs. Within the directorates, historical writers, as at present, will write histories of the components, the activities, and the operations of their directorates, but this writing will now form part of a centralized program, under the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Historical Staff. Once the present backlog of historical writings has been eliminated, the demands of the ongoing programs of the directorates should not be excessive, since these programs will now involve the updating of certain histories with some additional writing, and the writing of historical papers covering special operations and activities or changes in the organization and structure of

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components of the directorates.

19. While the Historical Staff requires neither a large library nor an archives under its own control, there are a few works of reference and some guides and aids to Government documents and to Agency records that it should possess. The present Historical Staff has a small collection of materials, including some original records, and in Source Document Index has a most valuable and useful research tool. The present collection should be maintained within the Historical Staff. It should be enlarged and broadened into an all-Agency historical collection, under a curator and with the services of a research assistant. Such a facility, when linked with the records management program, the Central Reference Service, and a CIA historical archives, if such should be established, would be invaluable to writers in their research in giving them guidance in locating materials, and would increase very considerably the accessibility and exploitation of documents needed for historical purposes.

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20. The Historical Staff. In the Interim Report of 30 April, the Staff was described, in paragraphs 4-10, as consisting of a Chief, Historical Staff; Deputy Chief, Historical

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Staff; four Historical Officers, one for each directorate, and each serving as Executive Secretary of the Historical Board of his directorate; and an administrative assistant and three secretaries. The Interim Report stated, "It is possible that on further study a small number of additional positions may be required, though no marked increase in the size of the Historical Staff over present strength is contemplated."

(Interim Report, par. 10) The Interim Report recommended supergrade level 17 or 18 for the Chief, but did not indicate the grade of the Deputy Chief or of the Historical Officers. While it may not be possible to make the appointment at supergrade 18, a 17 is strongly urged, with a 16 for the Deputy Chief, and a 15 or 16 for each of the Historical Officers. To these should be added the Curator, proposed in paragraph 19 of the present report, at a 15 or 16.

21. The appointment of an administrative assistant or intelligence assistant is still recommended, as is the appointment of a research associate or research assistant, to help the Curator (par. 19 of this report). A further consideration of the number of secretaries needed, indicates that three (Interim Report, par. 10) are insufficient. The appointment of four is recommended; one for the Chief, one for the Deputy Chief, and

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two for the Historical Officers. This would be a minimal staff for the ongoing, permanent program, and makes a total of thirteen positions for the proposed Historical Staff, as against ten in the present Historical Staff. However, two further positions will be required, for the Editor, Studies in Intelligence, and for a secretary-stenographer. In times of especially heavy work loads, temporary assistance should be provided by the employment of one or more persons as an editor or editorial assistant, on a contract basis, to assist the Historical Officers.

25 September 1968

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ANNEX A

Historical Staff, Present

Historian

Historian

Historian

Historian

General

General

General

Intelligence Asst.

Secretary - Steno

Secretary - Steno

Historical Staff, Proposed

Chief

Deputy Chief

Curator

Historical Officer

Historical Officer

Historical Officer

Historical Officer

(1) Research Assoc. or Asst.
Intelligence Asst.

Secretary - Steno

Secretary - Steno

(2) Secretary - Steno

(3) Secretary - Steno

The numbers (1), (2), and (3) represent additional positions.

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ANNEX B

A Historical Program for CIA

1946/47	1965	1966+	1968
<u>The Catching-up Program</u>	<u>The Continuing Program</u>		
<u>The Overall History</u>			
The DCI-CIA and the Intelligence Community ----->			
Office of the DCI and the DCI Area----->			
Offices of the Deputy Directors----->			
<u>The Directorate Histories</u>			
Offices of the Deputy Directors----->			
Components of the Directorates----->			
Overseas Activities and Operations----->			

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